English clubs began to hire the most promising schoolboys before they joined Irish sides. As this practice spread, it eventually eliminated a valuable source of income: the selling of players to English clubs. Despite this development it would, however, be inappropriate to view the relationship between the Irish and English football industries as a simple zero sum game as Irish clubs benefit from employing highly trained young players who return home after failing to establish careers in England.
INTRODUCTION
Irish professional footballers are a highly visible, yet curiously under-researched, part of the Irish emigration phenomenon. This is all the more remarkable because they have been part of a brawn drain that has lasted for more than a century. According to Bale (1991) , the brawn drain is a process in which the athletic and sporting talent of lesser-developed countries is siphoned off by colleges and professional teams from more economically advanced nations.
In this case, it is Irish footballers that have been siphoned off by professional teams in the English League.
2 Though there is a long tradition of Irish athletes 3 and boxers emigrating in order to take up careers in professional sport, the numbers involved are relatively small when compared to those who have left to play professional football. This is probably because the national leagues (North and South) have been unable to provide significant amounts of fulltime employment, though association football (or soccer) has long since been one of the more popular sports on the island of Ireland (Sugden and Bairner 1993) . While these migrant players receive a remarkable degree of coverage in the Irish mass media and, to a lesser extent, in the English equivalent, they have generally been ignored in studies of sports labour migration and of Irish emigration.
This paper seeks to overcome this deficiency by analysing the overall structure of the Irish brawn drain. 4 In doing so, it will draw upon world systems and resource dependency theories to show how the brawn drain was created, and subsequently extended, during the second half of the twentieth century. More specifically, I shall argue that the recent spread of youth policies among the major English clubs has placed additional constraints on the development of the football industry within Ireland.
CORE -PERIPHERY RELATIONS AND LABOUR MIGRATION
The most influential accounts of sport labour migration are derived from world systems theory (Wallerstein 1974) and from the neo-marxist dependency theory (Cardoso and Faletto 1979) . Though these contain some major flaws (Hettne 1983 ) I would argue that they provide a useful starting point for the analysis of uneven economic development in those cases where industries compete for the same resources on a cross-national basis. This is primarily because they seek to relate rates of development to international exchanges between nationally based industries, rather than simply referring to their internal production arrangements. The emphasis on trade and exchange is important because the primary aim of this paper is to 4 explain how a particular pattern of inter-industry relations, that is between the football industries of Ireland and England, inhibit development within Ireland. As Maguire and Bale (1994: 11-12) argue, 'the reason why Hungary loses its best footballers and why Kenya loses its best runners cannot be explained by events in those specific countries'.
Sociologists and geographers who draw on this tradition claim that the organizations at the core of the global sports system tend to dominate the sports audiences and labour markets of the periphery (Arbena 1994; Bale and Sang 1994; Klein 1989; Maguire and Bale 1994) . This generally occurs in three ways. First, the commodification and globalization of sport are driven by transnational organizations that have the power to generate wealth at the expense of clubs in the periphery. For example, major media corporations are able to encourage spectators in the periphery to watch satellite broadcasts of 'live' sporting events from major European leagues at the expense of less glamorous versions on offer at local stadia. Second, the appeal and, ultimately, the domination of the core leagues are enhanced by their ability to attract athletic talent from across the globe. This inevitably leads to the deskilling of the world's minor leagues. In addition, the presence of foreign stars adds to the appeal of satellite broadcasts for audiences in the (semi-) periphery who may prefer to watch their compatriots playing overseas on TV rather than in the local stadia. Finally, the countries and regions of the periphery are excluded from the centre of decision-making in global sports and are, as a consequence, unable to change these processes of domination. They must instead depend on whatever financial support is channelled in their direction from the international sporting authorities. Perhaps the most controversial claim advanced by writers within this perspective is that little genuine development is possible while this pattern of relations is in place. That which does occur is termed dependent development because it is constrained by unequal exchanges with the developed core (Maguire and Bale 1994) .
Empirical support for these claims can be found in studies of sport in Latin America and Africa. Arbena (1994) , for example, in his examination of the migration of soccer players from Latin America to Europe, finds that a recruitment relationship has developed between various South American countries and wealthy European clubs, principally in Spain and Italy.
These are able to extract the best players from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay by offering significantly higher salaries than those available locally. The clubs in these countries are, in any case, frequently forced to sell their best young players in order to survive. The result is that the subsequent standard of play, the match attendances and the gate receipts decline, with the result that it becomes even more difficult for clubs to survive without selling their best players.
Similar experiences have observed in the Dominican Republic where local fans have watched US and Japanese franchises sign up most of the top baseball players (Klein 1989 (Klein , 1991 . Some of these franchises, such as the Toronto Blue Jays and Los Angeles Dodgers, have taken the additional step of establishing academies in the Dominican Republic to locate, sign, and refine talent before sending it to North America for further development.
Uneven Development and Resource Dependency
It should be emphasized that this research is only concerned with the link between the recruitment practices of English clubs and the uneven development of the football industry in England and Ireland. A full assessment of the underdevelopment of Irish football would require consideration of a range of factors beyond the scope of this study. These would include the split between the southern and northern clubs in the 1920s, the management and organizational capabilities of the respective football associations, 5 the negative impact of satellite broadcasts of English football on attendances in Ireland, as well as competition from other sports for players and spectators. The Irish League (Northern Ireland) has also suffered from repeated outbreaks of sectarian violence notably since the 'troubles' emerged in the late 1960s (Sugden and Bairner 1993; Brodie 1980) . Once it is accepted that these factors have had an influence then the underdevelopment of Irish football cannot be attributed wholly to the English League's status as a buyer and the Irish leagues' status as sellers of labour.
Nevertheless, my argument is that the loss of skilled labour has constrained the development of Irish football, thereby reinforcing its subordinate status in relation to the English football industry. There are two strands to this thesis. First, professional football is unusual, even among labour intensive industries, in that the economic and sporting success is based entirely on its employees. The fact that labour is of critical importance to a club's performance is not in itself the source of the problem (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 47) . The problem only arises when teams are unable to hire, or retain, the best available footballers because other clubs possess greater economic power. In this particular instance, the problem is compounded by the fact that the other clubs are part of a different and wealthier league.
The second part of this argument, which concerns the subordinate position held by the Irish leagues, points to growing differences in economic power. My argument is that these differences have placed further constraints on the growth of football as a commercial industry within Ireland. This development may be fruitfully analysed through Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) This asymmetry in market relations is compounded by the fact that Irish players are generally eager to sign for English sides because they offer better economic and sporting opportunities (Brady 1980; Dervan 1994; Stapleton 1991) . By contrast, clubs in Northern
Ireland and in the Irish Republic can only survive by employing part-time and amateur players though some occasionally employ a small number of full-time professionals (Brodie 1980; Hannigan 1998) . Despite these qualifications, Irish clubs are able to retain some degree of bargaining power over transfer fees, provided they are able to control access to Irish players.
In order to understand how the brawn drain has changed I shall first describe the overall scale of this phenomenon before explaining how changes in recruitment methods have transformed relations between the Irish and English football industries. I shall then concentrate on the recruitment activities of the largest English clubs because they have led the brawn drain from its earliest days.
DATA AND METHODS
The empirical data for this research was assembled from a diverse range of published Players who were employed on a non-contract, or loan, basis were excluded, as were those who had a contract but never actually appeared for the first team.
Place of birth was used as the initial selection criterion (e.g., Belfast, Dublin). This variable initially contained a small element of bias, as it did not account for the possibility that the player, or his family, may have emigrated to England before he became a professional footballer. Similarly, the families of some players who were born in England may have emigrated to Ireland. To address this problem, the information on place of birth was compared with those contained in biographies of international players (Brodie 1980; Cullen 1993; McGarrigle 1996) . Since this exercise only produced a minor reduction in the overall number of Irish players I am confident that this information is reasonably reliable (less than five per cent of the cases had to be re-classified).
Having identified the initial employing club, two additional variables were created to describe the divisional status and size of each club at the time it signed any Irish player.
While the data on divisional status were obtained directly from Robinson (1998) , I had to use the average home attendance figures for each season as an indicator of club size (Tabner 1992; Rothman's Football Yearbooks 1991 . The advantage of attendance figures is that they give an estimation of club income for a period in which this was mostly based on gate receipts. However, the disadvantage is that they do not capture the additional purchasing power provided by wealthy directors or owners. Given that most clubs were either promoted or relegated during the course of this period, the process of data coding also became even more painstaking as the size categories tended to change according to the clubs' success or failure. Nevertheless, clubs were initially ranked in descending order for each season, using their average home attendance figures, before dividing them into roughly equal numbers of large, medium, and small. (Table I) . While this figure may not appear very large when spread over a 50-year period it worth noting that only Scotland has supplied more players to English football (McGovern 1999) . Furthermore, soccer has always attracted fewer players and spectators in Ireland than the Gaelic games of hurling and football (Cronin 1999; Sugden and Bairner 1993) . More significantly, this figure does not represent the total outflow, as not all of those who were signed by English clubs succeeded in appearing for the first team (Hannigan 1998) . It also excludes those who were signed by Scottish clubs (Moorhouse 1986: 257) . and by the effects of the conflict itself. Some 75 professional footballers were killed in action (Russell 1997: 124) and an unknown number of others were injured. It is also likely that a (Table I) .
This development probably reflects the growth of the game in the Republic in an era when the national team enjoyed unprecedented success under its English manager, Jack Charlton (Cronin 1999: 129-142; Hannigan 1998: 20-28 Finally, it is worth noting that the consistency and durability of this outward flow, and the urban origins of those involved, contrasts sharply with the general characteristics of Irish emigration to Britain. In general, Irish emigration is strongly influenced by how the Irish labour market performs in relation to that of Britain, especially in comparisons of after-tax wages and unemployment rates (NESC 1991: 111-124) . Accordingly, emigration tends to increase during periods of economic stagnation and decrease during relatively periods of economic growth. By contrast, the migration of footballers, which is determined by the amount of direct recruitment undertaken by English employers, has remained remarkably stable in terms of direction and volume for most of the late twentieth century. Consequently, the Irish experience of immigration during the prosperous years of the 1970s and the 1990s
was not matched by a reversal, or even a decline, in the brawn drain.
Furthermore, the urban and predominantly east coast origins of football migrants (e.g., Belfast, Derry, Dublin and Cork) differs from that of ordinary emigrants. The latter have typically consisted of a mixture of urban and rural with relatively higher proportions from rural communities along the western seaboard (NESC 1991: 75-77; MacLaughlin 1994: 50 The rise in the number of trainees was primarily the result of a strategic decision taken by some leading English clubs to invest in scouting and nursery-style arrangements. Prior to the 1980s most scouts were unpaid enthusiasts or ex-players who had informal relationships with particular clubs. Such relationships were gradually replaced by more formal arrangements, some of which included employment on a part-time basis. One of the most well-known is Pat (Hannigan 1998: 27) . Other clubs have also begun discussions with Irish youth sides about similar arrangements. These practices enable clubs to monitor potential players as they enter their teens, that is, before they can be legally signed as trainees at the age of fifteen years. Keith Gillespie, for example, started travelling from Belfast to Manchester United at the age of twelve years (Observer 19.2.1995) .
These measures, which form part of a widely publicized investment in youth policies by leading English clubs (FourFourTwo, February 1995; Guardian 1.12.1999) , can be interpreted as a shift from a market-based solution to the problem of finding skilled labour towards one based on internal hierarchical arrangements (McGovern 1999) . The principal advantages of this approach are that it enables employers to procure skills in an industry that is characterized by skill shortages at the highest level while simultaneously providing a much greater degree of control over labour quality than under the transfer system. The fact that English clubs are producing an increasing proportion of players in this way suggests that they have simply adopted a rational response to the problem of procuring scarce resources at relatively low costs. What is of particular interest to this study is that practices that were developed within an English context have been extended across the Irish Sea.
In short, the activities of the schools and scouts have the same effect as those of the baseball academies in the Dominican Republic (Klein 1991) : they locate and remove the finest natural resources from the local environment and send them to one where they can enjoy greater economic and sporting opportunities.
THE RECRUITING CLUBS
Much of the recruitment activity was undertaken by the better supported and richer clubs The influence of club size is reinforced by evidence of increasing concentration of Irish recruitment activity, at least until the foundation of the Premiership in the early 1990s. After the first ten years the total number of clubs that imported Irish players declined slightly before rising again to half of all league clubs in 1986-95 (Table III) The apprentice method was, by contrast, highly concentrated among the top 10 clubs for the first thirty years after the War though the numbers involved were initially quite small. Though it has fallen since the 1970s, the proportion was still close to half of all trainees by 1995 (45.8 per cent). Furthermore, half (50.0 per cent) continued to do so at the end of this period.
Manchester United and Arsenal
Two of the largest Premiership (first division) clubs, Manchester United and Arsenal, stand out for their exceptional tendency to sign Irish footballers. They have, for instance, been the leading importers of Irish players (68 players or 12 per cent of the total) in general and, within that, the leading producers of Irish trainees (33 trainees or 21 per cent of the total).
Manchester United was also among the first clubs to develop a youth policy within Britain and in the 1960s it became the first to incorporate Irish teenagers into these arrangements (Dunphy 1991: 280-81) . However, the best indicator of Arsenal and Manchester United's long-standing attraction to Irish sources is that they were the only two clubs among the top ten destinations for Irish players in each decade since 1946. Since both clearly have a wellestablished tradition for importing Irish players, it is worth examining their practices in detail.
The strength of the 'Irish connection' at these clubs has been documented by McGarrigle (1990; and Scally (1998) in fan oriented publications that describe the various Irish players, managers and scouts employed by these clubs. These reveal that both were among the first to appoint talent scouts in Ireland. According to McGarrigle (1990) However, McGarrigle (1991: 134) claims that it is Arsenal who has established the most formidable scouting network in Ireland.
While the club has, like Manchester United, one scout in Northern Ireland its chief scout in the Republic is supported by a team of five. It has, as indicated earlier, also formed nursery style links with Dublin schoolboy leagues.
The success of Arsenal's youth training scheme is illustrated by the source and low cost of those recruited since 1970 (Appendix 1). This shows that Arsenal relied heavily on the apprentice method while the Manchester club was much more inclined to buy established, older players from Irish league clubs. Consequently, Arsenal's extensive use of the apprenticeship system enabled them to recruit Irish teenagers at a very low cost while Manchester United have had to pay a number of transfer fees. Even so, these fees look extremely modest when compared to the record-breaking transfer fees that this club paid out during the same period (e.g., Bryan
Robson £1.3 million, Roy Keane £3.75 million, Andy Cole £7 million). Given that these are two of the major employers of Irish players, this suggests that Irish footballers have been recruited rather cheaply. 10 Such a claim would be consistent with existing research on sport labour migration which shows that the donor leagues from the developing world generally act as a cheap source of sporting talent for clubs from the more economically developed parts of the world (Klein 1991; Maguire and Bale 1994) .
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Social ties and recruitment networks, such as those that created the 'Irish connection' at these two clubs, are not unusual in determining how, and where, emigrants find employment (Portes 1995; Tilly and Tilly 1998: 190-94) . Corcoran (1993) , for instance, has shown how the presence of friends, relatives or people of similar ethnic origins all influence the destinations chosen by Irish emigrants, as well as their subsequent chances of procuring employment. Critically, once such links are established they are likely to sustain themselves (Tilly and Tilly 1998: 190 (Brady 1980; Stapleton 1991; Scally 1998: 119) . The corollary is that these clubs were able to retain young, homesick, employees who may never previously have travelled outside their native country. In short, the reputation which Arsenal and Manchester United have established for hiring Irish players carries a significant element of self-perpetuation.
CONCLUSION
In an industry where labour is the most critical of resources, the economic power of the wealthiest clubs provides the means to dominate the labour market to the point where they can buy the kind of success that less powerful clubs can never hope to achieve. This virtuous circle is a well-known phenomenon within American football where large-city teams dominate by purchasing emerging players from smaller-city teams (Leifer 1995: 201) . What is perhaps not so obvious is that this success may be achieved in global sports, such as association football, at the expense of the same industry in other countries. In such cases, the less powerful clubs in the donor leagues are trapped in a vicious circle in which they lose players and fans to richer foreign clubs. This, in turn, ensures that the quality of the spectacle that they offer remains relatively low, with the result that they are unable to achieve the kind of competitive and commercial success that would enable them to recruit and retain better players and larger crowds.
From the evidence presented here, the association football industry in Ireland would appear to contain many of the characteristic features of this situation. Like Chile and Uruguay in football (Arbena 1994 ) and the Dominican Republic in baseball (Klein 1991) , it has watched its finest sporting talent leave to join one of the wealthier leagues at the core of sharply with that of earlier decades. Indeed, the event is now so rare as to be virtually nonexistent.
Nevertheless, many of the teams in the Irish leagues contain players who failed to make it beyond the trainee stage with English clubs. Irish domestic football gains from such return migration because those who return have experience of full-time training with professional coaches and established professionals. Additionally, the national teams (Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland) benefit from having players training and competing at a significantly higher standard in the English leagues. Both of these are significant because they show that the relationship between the Irish and English leagues still has dimensions that render it more complicated than a simple zero sum game in which one party always gains at the expense of the other. 12 But if the relationship is to be characterised in these respects as one of dependent development it is also one in which the terms of dependency have changed. In the past Irish clubs looked to their English counterparts for large transfer fees. Now they look to the same clubs for young players who have failed to make the grade but are happy to return home and play at a lower standard. Republic may even use the domestic TV channel for this purpose. This degree of exposure is supplemented by extensive match coverage in the morning and evening newspapers. In sum,
Irish football suffers similar contradictions to those of baseball and football in Latin America (Klein 1991; Arbena 1994) . It has been penetrated and dominated by foreign employers and
TV channels yet the overseas achievements of its players are a source of national pride.
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Notes 1 I would like to thank Ellis Cashmore, Colin Mills, Leslie Sklair, the editor and three anonymous referees for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 Scottish clubs, notably Celtic and Rangers (Moorhouse 1986: 257) , have also imported Irish footballers. However, the numbers involved have been relatively small by comparison.
3 Bale's (1991: 198) study of the brawn drain included reference to the recruitment of young Irish athletes by leading U.S. athletics colleges (e.g., Villanova University).
4 Magee and Sugden (1998) have already conducted a micro-level analysis that uses semistructured interviews to examine the reasons why young Northern Irish footballers join English clubs. 5 The vote of no confidence in the leadership abilities of the Football Association of
Ireland executive in 1996 is indicative of some of its failings (Sunday Tribune 10.3. 1996) . 6 Irish clubs have occasionally imported players from England. However, this activity
